



# cfm news & notes

Information is ammunition for your struggle. A fighter without ammunition is not a fighter. And for you, a fighter without information cannot speak.

Samora M. Machel, President of FRELIMO to CFM delegation, Dar es Salaam, 8/71.

## CFM MEETS WITH FRELIMO INFORMATION OFFICER

On June 19, CFM met with Jorge Rebelo, FRELIMO'S Secretary for Information. Comrade Rebelo spoke at length about the current situation in Mozambique and developments which have taken place within FRELIMO within the last six months. Because we found the discussion so informative, we have printed a detailed report of Comrade Rebelo's talk as the major article for the summer issue of News and Notes.

At the meeting CFM was able to present a check for \$1550 to Comrade Rebelo. \$1100 came from you--our contributors and pledgers. In early May CFM organized a fund raising evening in New York City where we showed the film A Luta Continua and auctioned off African artifacts. That evening brought us \$450 which was part of the money given to Comrade Rebelo.

Comrade Rebelo and representatives from PAIGC (Guinea Bissau) and MPLA and FNLA (Angola) were in New York to represent their countries as observers and participants in the current sessions of the U.N. Committee of 24 (on Decolonization). In the fall of 1972 the U.N. General Assembly recognized FRELIMO, PAIGC, and MPLA (and FLNA) as the authentic representatives of the aspirations of the people of their countries. Representatives from these movements are included in U.N. activities concerning their countries. In this session the representatives reported to the Committee of 24 on current developments and participated in discussions involving the situation in Southern Africa.

COMRADE REBELO'S REPORT TO CFM ON CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN MOZAMBIQUE  
JUNE 19th, 1973

First, I would like to thank you for the money which you have just given us, and for the growing support which it represents. But in thanking you, I would like to make one point: We collaborate, we are two fronts of the same struggle. You are not on the sidelines, and, in fact, in some ways, the struggle on our front is easier. For us, the enemy is clear, and the ways of struggle are clear. Our people are with us in our struggle. But you are working in a society which is hostile to your efforts.

Many of the support groups in the Western countries send us bandages, clothes, and concern for our "poor suffering people," but they do not give us political support, they do not see that we share a struggle. The struggle which you wage helps us in two ways: materially, and in isolating our direct enemy. We need and appreciate the things and money which you send to us, but we also need people who can teach others about the facts of our struggle.

Our struggle is helpful to you, too. We can help you to clarify the exploitation and repression of the system under which you live. If you approach an average person here and say "Don't you see how this system exploits you, and how it represses you?" many of them cannot see. But when you point out the situation in the Portuguese colonies, where the exploitation is very clear -- where a laborer is forced to work growing cotton for the profit of the Portuguese all his life -- then, the people here begin to think in new ways about their own conditions. And the other way in which we help you, is that when we have won our struggle, Mozambique will be one more base of support -- ideological and political, if not material support-- for your struggle. We are brothers in the struggle because we understand that the revolution is the perspective.

Two things which we have received from you recently were especially valuable to the struggle at the time of their arrival. We had been hoping and asking for the transistor radios for quite some time, but at the exact moment when we received them from you, we had received an urgent request from the military commander in Manica e Sofala for some radios. Our struggle is expanding rapidly there, and many people want to hear the daily FRELIMO broadcasts. We are now broadcasting 45 minutes daily from Dar es Salaam (Radio Tanzania) and 1 hour a day from a new station in Lusaka. So we needed the radios most urgently when they arrived.

And your buttons. At the last Central Committee meeting, members of the Central Committee were asking for the buttons, for we had discussed the buttons many times before. At that time, we had received only your small, sample shipment, and we had just enough to give one to each member of the Central Committee. But now we have had the big shipment, and we have begun to distribute them to the cadres and the people.

CABO DELGADO:

Portuguese Posts Attacked

I will tell you now about the developments of our struggle since Comrade dos Santos, the Vice-President of FRELIMO, met with you in the fall. In Cabo Delgado, the province where the armed struggle began, the land and people are liberated. For several years, the Portuguese have been unable to move, they have been essentially confined to their posts. We observed, however, that the existence of these camps hampers, to a certain extent, the work of national reconstruction, for the Portuguese could and did make occasional destructive forays into the countryside of the province, slowing production, massacring villagers, eventually

disturbing the work of the schools and health centers. So in September, FRELIMO called a meeting of all the cadres from Cabo Delgado province, to plan new strategies and priorities for the military and political program in the province. A new goal was set: the destruction of all the remaining posts in the province. Since then, we have mounted about fifty major attacks against the entrenched Portuguese bases in Cabo Delgado. Each has caused serious damage to the Portuguese. Many Portuguese soldiers have been killed, and the morale of those who remain is deteriorating steadily. Some of the posts have been abandoned. In those which have not yet been abandoned, the soldiers' morale is so low that they leave the post every night and hide in the bush surrounding the post to sleep, out of fear of a FRELIMO attack. The South African press has carried news of the attacks now and then. A few weeks ago, for example, they reported an incident in which four hundred FRELIMO soldiers attacked a base in Cabo Delgado province, in Lussoma. The Portuguese resent the fact that the South Africans publicize FRELIMO's advance, and this is one major source of the contradictions between the Portuguese and the South Africans.

#### National Reconstruction

Now let me summarize some of the work of national reconstruction which all this is intended to defend. We organized and have conducted a census in the northern two-thirds of Cabo Delgado, north of the Montepuez River. This was intended to facilitate our planning for health and education in the province. One of the first immediate results of that survey is that FRELIMO can now say with certainty that all children in the area of the census are in school.

You know that we base our political organization on the circle (circulo). Several circles form a locality and several localities, a district. So we have intensified the efforts of the political commissars at the circle level to overcome the resistance of the parents to sending their children to school. In some areas, where a given village does not have a school, the children are encouraged to go to a boarding school. There were and continue to be a lot of problems, such as parental resistance, to be overcome, and it has been a long, hard process. But we are succeeding.

We have also had great success in the area of production. The biggest problem in the area of production has been the Portuguese bombing of our crops and storage places. But one of the decisions of the meeting of cadres was to improve our anti-aircraft capabilities. We have done this, and as a result, this year's production in Cabo Delgado is unprecedented for any province or any year. There is enough to feed all of our people and we have opened new commercial trade centers in the province as well. As you know, most of our production is for consumption. But, on the other hand, we are unable to produce all the basic needs of our people inside Mozambique. So we have produced an excess of some crops (cashew nuts and oil seeds, for example) for export to exchange for the things which we need but cannot produce (soap, matches, clothes, paraffin, etc.) Until recently, the excess production was carried to the border by the people who had produced it, and only there could they trade it for the things which they needed. It was a somewhat disorganized and inefficient method of commerce, and we now have trading centers as deep as possible into the liberated areas. Now the producers bring their things to the trading centers to exchange them, and our

exports, though still transported by people, are carried through a well organized system of special teams, supplemented by some members of the military.

A severe shortage of cadres and medical supplies have meant that our development of the health system in the liberated areas has not been as rapid as we would like. No matter how strong our political base in the people, without cadres and supplies, we cannot develop a health system. We have recently selected some of our best health cadres and sent them to our hospital in Mtwara, Tanzania, to train others. This programme will greatly contribute to the development of our health programme.

You may have heard a good deal about the successful large-scale attack on Mueda which we launched earlier this year. As you can now understand, this was simply part of the general strategy for Cabo Delgado province which was outlined in September.

#### NIASSA:

Niassa province was the second province in which we began the armed struggle. It presents many special problems, because it is both one of the largest in area and the smallest in population. There are large regions which are completely deserted, with no population to support our militants. The Portuguese have their posts, and FRELIMO confines the Portuguese to these posts. The population which does inhabit Niassa province groups itself around FRELIMO. One reason that the population of the province is so low is that many of the people of Niassa fled to Tanzania and Malawi when the armed struggle broke out in their province, and are living in refugee camps in these countries. FRELIMO has undertaken a political campaign in the refugee camps to convince the people to return to their homes, and this campaign is having success. For the population which is in Niassa province, the situation with respect to education, production, and health is advancing in ways similar to that in Cabo Delgado.



## TETE:

The province of Tete has seen the fastest development of the struggle. We opened the Tete front in 1968, and by 1971 we were present throughout the province. One factor in the quickness of our success was that we had learned a great deal from our experience in Cabo Delgado and Niassa. Another important factor was that the people of Tete were more receptive to politicization. In Tete, there are mines, more white settlers, more business and the people of Tete have a more direct and immediate experience of the exploitation and humiliation of colonialism.

It is, of course, essential that the national reconstruction efforts in Tete keep up with the military developments, and in this light, FRELIMO assigned two of its cadres who had studied agriculture and economy abroad to the province of Tete in 1972, where they made a survey of the conditions, and a series of recommendations which we have begun to implement.

There have been very important <sup>military</sup> developments in Tete province in the last year. I'm sure that Comrade Marcelino dos Santos told you about the attack which we launched on the capital city, Tete, and of its success.

### Cabora Bassa.

I'm also sure that you are eager to hear about the development of Cabora Bassa. Recently, the Portuguese have been saying "In 1968, Mondlane said that if the Portuguese finish Cabora Bassa, FRELIMO will be defeated. We are building Cabora Bassa, so this means that FRELIMO is being defeated." This subject has been taken up by them so that one can hear it almost once a week on the major commentary show on the Portuguese government radio station in Mozambique. FRELIMO is cutting the communication lines to and from the dam. Railroads and roads are frequently mined, and we have just recently discovered the alternate route which they had developed after we gained power over the traditional routes. Security at the site is very tight -- there are three lines of defense. So we do not consider it is worth it to attack the construction at this stage. For that, we would have to amass a huge concentration of troops. This would play directly into their hands, for they could destroy a huge concentration of our forces. We have no intention of making it easy for them!

Cabora Bassa is much less important to FRELIMO now that we have crossed the Zambezi. If Cabora Bassa had been built and the white settlers brought before we crossed the river, that would have made Cabora Bassa important. But FRELIMO has crossed the Zambezi -- we are throughout Tete and into Manica e Sofala. Cabora Bassa is now only one target among many targets, and it is increasingly isolated by the day-to-day activities of FRELIMO. It is one target for FRELIMO, but not the major target.

## MANICA E SOFALA:

The armed struggle in Manica e Sofala started in July, 1972 -- it has not yet been one year. FRELIMO is still in the early stages of ambushes, mining roads, attacking the small Portuguese camps. One of the most interesting developments in Manica e Sofala has been the response of the people, which has been even stronger than that in Tete, again, we believe, because of the experience of oppression which the people here have. As has been learned historically, the political awareness of the people in the towns is also greater. Within a few weeks of the beginning of the struggle, parents began to show up at FRELIMO bases with their children saying, "Here is my son, here is my daughter. I want them to be part of the struggle."

Another example of the response of the people was particularly frustrating to the Portuguese. They knew ahead of time that we were about ready to launch the armed struggle in Manica e Sofala, and they tried to do some psychological work to prepare the people for our coming. They went around to the villages distributing guns for the "defense" of the villages, along with instructions for the peasants to shoot us when we came. In the first few days of the armed struggle, five hundred of these guns were turned over to us by the people.

Before the armed struggle in Manica e Sofala began, one group of workers chose one of their members to come to Tete and find FRELIMO so that they could convey a message from the group. When he found the leadership of FRELIMO in Tete he conveyed his message -- it was a criticism of FRELIMO. Why, he wanted to know, was FRELIMO fighting only in Tete. If the plan was to liberate only Tete, then this group of workers must come to Tete to save themselves. But we told him that FRELIMO would come to Manica e Sofala, and gave him very specific instructions for the work of preparation which he and his friends could do. And this group of workers did much of the political groundwork in their area in Manica e Sofala.

The expansion of the struggle in any area depends on the success which FRELIMO has in recruiting in the area itself, and as you can guess from these examples, the recruitment in Manica e Sofala has been very rapid.

The work of national reconstruction has not yet really begun in that province. There are no health stations or schools yet in this province, partly because we are faced with a serious shortage of cadres and lack of equipment.

#### PORTUGUESE TACTICS:

It is also important to talk about the ways in which the Portuguese respond to FRELIMO's advance. They are presently using three major tactics.

The first is to attempt to infiltrate the movements, an attempt which in Guinea resulted in the assassination of Comrade Cabral. FRELIMO has discovered already infiltrators in our organization, men who had acted as deserters from the Portuguese. They have confessed that the mission entrusted to them by the colonialists was to assassinate the president of FRELIMO.

The second tactic which the Portuguese have begun to use is to disguise certain of their African units as FRELIMO soldiers and send them out to practice brutality in the villages. They provide them with uniforms much like ours, and with weapons which they have captured from us, and tell them to tell the villagers that they are from FRELIMO. Then they are told to beat and torture the villagers. At first, this tactic succeeded, and some people were quite confused. But then the people of one village where they had tried this, arrested these soldiers and brought them to FRELIMO leaders and said: "Are these really FRELIMO soldiers?" When we realized what this tactic was, we took these Portuguese soldiers around to many mass meetings, and had them confess the plans of the Portuguese to all the assembled villagers. Now, whenever anyone tries these kinds of tactics, the villagers know to arrest them and bring them to the FRELIMO bases.

All these material developments are important, but not nearly as important as the political orientation under which they take place. You may all know that after Mondlane's assassination in 1969, there was a political struggle within FRELIMO, ultimately won by those with a revolutionary orientation. The time has come to consolidate that orientation, to impress its impact upon all dimensions of our struggle. At the last meeting of the Central Committee of FRELIMO, we realized that our struggle had developed greatly -- there are many schools, hospitals, and so on that are the responsibility of FRELIMO. We were not doing enough to fulfill these responsibilities. We agreed that two objectives must be continually met in the development of the Mozambican struggle: First, that the work of all institutions should be always in accord with the political line of FRELIMO. And second, that the efficiency of all FRELIMO efforts should be maximum.

One of the methods chosen to help us meet these objectives and consolidate the gains of the struggle was the organization of a series of conferences: A conference on pedagogy in January, a conference of health cadres in February, and a conference of women in April. Each of these conferences studied the relevant problems in depth.


The third tactic which the Portuguese are using is to manoeuvre international and local public opinion with the propaganda of territorial autonomy and with the elections. FRELIMO has responded to this strategy with extensive political work, especially by using our radio time to reach the areas where the armed struggle has not yet begun. Our underground workers and refugees from that area report that almost all Mozambicans listen clandestinely to our broadcasts, despite the fact that it is against the law to do so. We received proof of this once when Radio Tanzania was unable to broadcast for a few weeks, for we began to receive letters smuggled out of southern Mozambique by the miners asking what had happened to our broadcasts.

The Portuguese tactic, that of offering the Mozambican people meaningless concessions and the illusion of autonomy, is relatively new. It seems designed mostly to ease the conscience of the international allies of Portugal. For example, the Portuguese want to enter the European Economic Community (the Common Market), but they cannot do so if they still have colonies, so they create a "Legislative Assembly" in Mozambique to convince the EEC that Mozambique is autonomous.

The United States has been giving extensive support to the Portuguese Government. Last year, for example, \$436 million was given to Portugal, thereby buttressing the weak Portuguese economy. More recently, a few weeks ago the United States provided Portugal with 12 helicopters, 6 of which are already in Mozambique. That was announced by the Portuguese press itself. The British, French and West German Governments do not stay behind in their support for Portuguese colonialism. They furnish weapons, vehicles and aircraft without which Portugal would have been forced to give up the war.

We want to repeat what we have already said many times: without the support of the Western countries, particularly those in NATO, Portugal would have been defeated long ago and the peoples of Angola, Mozambique and Guinea (Bissau) would today be free and independent.

# committee for a FREE MOZAMBIQUE



616 WEST 116TH STREET #1A

NEW YORK, N.Y. 10027

July 25, 1973

Dear Friend of Mozambique:

Our summer News and Notes is a detailed report of a fascinating talk given by Comrade Jorge Rebelo, FRELIMO's Secretary for Information, to New York CFM members on June 19, 1973.

Rebelo's talk discusses in depth FRELIMO's military advances and the growing progress of national reconstruction in the liberated areas. These successes have posed a severe threat to the Portuguese regime and the other white minority regimes in Southern Africa. With the help of their allies, the Portuguese have resorted to increasingly brutal tactics of repression. Some of these tactics, such as the wholesale massacre of villagers and torture of political prisoners, are only now being exposed in the press.

Also enclosed with News and Notes is a brochure on "The High Cost of Breaking Sanctions" which is about the campaign to restore U.S. adherence to the U.N. sanctions against Rhodesia. Voting on new legislation to restore sanctions is expected in the Senate (Bill S. 1868) by the end of July and in the House (Bill H.R. 8005) in September. CFM supporters are urged to write their Senators and Congressmen immediately -- on this issue, it can make a difference! The importance of strengthening sanctions against the racist Smith regime for the struggle in Mozambique and all of Southern Africa should be clear to all.

A LUTA CONTINUA !

Committee for a Free Mozambique

NY Working Committee  
and Pledgers

Barbara Barnes  
Martha S. Bean  
Patrick Cheatham  
Virginia Dike  
Dorsett Edmunds  
Lawrence Frank  
Nancy Freehafer  
Nick & Gayle Garin  
Judy & Marty Hanlon  
Janet Hooper  
Karl M. Kindt III  
Ellen Kirby  
Kathie Krumm  
Peter Lary  
Jennifer L. Link  
Mary McAnally  
William & Ruth Minter  
Tim Smith  
Jay & Karen Spaulding  
Jim & Lynne Weikart

(partial list)

## LEGISLATION

Senator Humphrey and Congressmen Don Fraser and Charles Diggs introduced S. 1868 and H.R. 8005 to re-instate U.S. compliance with sanctions against Rhodesia. There are 29 Senate co-sponsors and 103 House co-sponsors to date. We anticipate Congressional action in late summer or early fall.

## BACKGROUND

Rhodesia is a breakaway British colony in southern Africa. 5% of its population, which is white, denies political and human rights to 5 1/2 million Blacks. No country in the world recognizes their legitimacy. In 1968 the United Nations established mandatory sanctions against the white minority regime headed by Ian Smith.

The U. S. Congress enacted the Byrd Amendment in the fall of 1971 to override the United Nations sanctions program. The U. S. has been importing chrome, ferrochrome, nickel and other strategic materials from Rhodesia ever since.

Asked, "When do you foresee a phased hand-over to majority rule?" Mr. Ian Smith replied, "Never."

The action of [the U.S.] government to break sanctions and to begin to import chrome was a severe blow to our struggle for freedom... Economic sanctions provided us with the only tool we have in our non-violent struggle for a free Rhodesia.

Bishop Abel Muzorewa  
President, African National Council

r  
e  
p  
e  
a  
l

## SWING VOTES IN CONGRESS

### REPRESENTATIVES:

Wayne Hays\*, Charles Carney (Ohio), Frank Annunzio, Edward Derwinski, Dan Rostenkowski, John Kluczynski, Robert McClory, Tom Railsback, Samuel Young (Ill.), Ray Madden (Ind.), Guy Vander Jagt, Martha Griffiths (Mich.), Leonor Sullivan (Mo.), John Dent, Thomas Morgan, Gus Yatron, Joseph Vigorito, Lawrence Coughlin (Pa.), Thaddeus Dulski, Jack Kemp, Mario Biaggi, Peter Peyser (N. Y.), Silvio Conte (Mass.), Robert Giaimo (Conn.), Dominick Daniels (N. J.), Clarence Long (Md.), Robert Mollohan\* (W. Va.), Frank Stubblefield\*(Ky.), Ike Andrews (N.C.), Richard Fulton (Tenn.), Charles Bennett, William Chappell, Claude Pepper, Sam Gibbons (Fla.), Charles Wilson (Calif.)

### SENATORS:

William Saxbe\* and Robert Taft\* (Ohio) Charles Mathias (Md.) Lowell Weicker (Conn.) William Roth (Del.) Richard Schweiker (Pa.) Ernest Hollings\*(S.C.) Walter Huddleston\* and Marlow Cook\* (Ky.) Lawton Chiles (Fla.) James Pearson (Kans.) Joseph Montoya (N.M.) Lee Metcalf (Mont.)

\*ferrochrome plants in district/state

### For further information:

WASHINGTON OFFICE ON AFRICA  
110 Maryland Ave., N.E., D.C. 20002


202-546-7961

AMERICAN COMMITTEE ON AFRICA  
164 Madison Ave. N.Y., N.Y. 10016  
212-532-3700

## BYRD AMENDMENT

# The High Cost of Breaking Sanctions

**U.S. SUPPORT OF: Racism  
Minority Rule Police State  
Forced Labor**



**U.S. LOSS OF:  
Jobs  
Credibility  
Respect for law**

## EIGHT REASONS WHY WE SUPPORT RE-INSTATING SANCTIONS

1. Renewing sanctions would support self-determination by the majority in Zimbabwe, the African name for "Rhodesia." Methodist Bishop Abel Muzorewa, leader of the African National Council, advocates sanctions as a major factor in a non-violent solution satisfactory to his people.
2. Importing chrome supports the forced labor system in Rhodesia. The Apartheid like system restricts Africans to arid "tribal reserves." Africans must work as migrant laborers in the white economy. African workers cannot strike; collective bargaining is virtually impossible; vagrancy and pass laws subject laborers to constant police controls; breaking a labor contract is a criminal act. Union Carbide and Foote Mineral Co. own chrome mines that operate within and support this system.
3. Importing Rhodesian ferrochrome is hurting the U.S. ferrochrome industry. 307 people in the Foote Mineral ferrochrome plant in Steubenville, Ohio are going to lose their jobs in 1973 because the market is flooded with ferrochrome produced in Rhodesia and South Africa by forced labor. The Ferroalloys Association has applied for relief from excessive imports because the entire industry is threatened by these low-priced imports.
4. Breaking sanctions did not eliminate any alleged dependence on Soviet chrome. In 1972, while we were importing chrome from Rhodesia, Russian ore claimed exactly as much of the market as it had in the previous four years: 58 per cent. It is a NATO ally, Turkey, not the Soviet Union, which has lost market position because of Rhodesian chrome imports.
5. Renewing sanctions will not threaten our national defense. President Nixon has proposed disposal of more than 5 million tons of excess chrome ore and ferrochrome from the national stockpile because they are not required for defense needs.
6. Sanctions co-operate with other factors to bring economic and political pressure on the Ian Smith regime. Rhodesia's 1971 trade deficit was the largest in Rhodesian history, Rhodesia has lost international political standing by closing the Zambian border and by imposing collective punishment on African villagers. Freedom fighters are now receiving support from the local African population inside Rhodesia.
7. The U.S. has a treaty obligation to carry out the sanctions program which we co-sponsored in the United Nations. Our sanctions-breaking undermines our proclaimed posture of adherence to international law.
8. "The future of the African-American relations will be greatly determined by the U.S. policy in matters relating to self-determination in southern Africa" Zambian President Kaunda.

## ACTION SUGGESTIONS

INFLUENCE SWING VOTES IN CONGRESS  
(See list on back page) (positions of Congressmen are available from the Washington Office on Africa)

1. Find out your Senators' and Representative's current position on sanctions
2. Organize a delegation to visit your representatives in their local offices when they make home visits
3. Conduct a constituent letter-writing campaign to press your representatives to vote for H.R. 8005 and S. 1868
4. Interest groups and individuals to whom your representatives listen to urge their support of sanctions
5. Activate a group in your district to co-ordinate efforts to influence them
6. If your representatives have supported sanctions, urge them to co-sponsor bills H.R. 8005 and S. 1868
7. Issue support statements from local groups to the President, to Congress and to local press
8. Use radio, press and TV to publicize the issue and to advocate your support for sanctions

"We specifically urge the Nixon administration to... vigorously support U. N. sanctions against Southern Rhodesia and to end all dealings with the illegal Smith regime."

Congressional Black Caucus  
January, 1973